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1. Introduction
This article is concerned with Civil Society Organizations
(CSO) and the role accorded to these organizations in
contributing to citizens’ representation within the Euro-
pean Union (EU).1 At the turn of the century, much at-
tention has been given to CSOs in the context of the EU’s
democratic deficit. The standard model of representative
democracy privileges other forms of political participation,
notably voting in or standing for elections for the Euro-
pean Parliament.2 The idea to complement this standard
model with CSO participation departs from the assump-
tion that increasing opportunities for citizens to influence
EU-level policy would foster engagement with the EU.3
With the above idea in mind, the drafters of the Lis-
bon Treaty have explicitly acknowledged existing chan-
nels as well as having created new channels for partici-
pation.4 The principle of representative democracy has
1 CSO refers to “a range of organisations which include: the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers federations—the ‘social partners’);
organisations representing social and economic players, which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for instance, consumer organisa-
tions); non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which bring people together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights
organisations, charitable organisations, educational and training organisations, etc.; community-based organisations (CBOs), i.e. organisations set up
within society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, family associations and all organisations through
which citizens participate in local and municipal life” (European Commission, 2002).
2 The standard model of democratic representation works through institutions staffed by elected officials. The elections are important for two reasons:
Firstly, because by the ‘one person one vote’ rule, political equality has been translated institutionally in a manner that gives citizens not only the right
to participate in the authorization of the political leaders that represent them but also in their possible dismissal in the next election. The second reason
is that political parties in elections compete on the basis of a program that aggregates voters’ preferences in such a way that it finds maximum appeal
and through this program links voters to (coalitions of) politicians.
3 In addition, non-institutionalized attempts for participation happen in the last years, such as massive protest against the EU–Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) by means of self-organized online petitions.
4 Political participation by citizens refers to the activities of citizens and their associations directed at influencing the policy of governments or inter-
national organizations. With respect to the EU such activities can range from ‘voting in elections for the European Parliament’, ‘contributing to a
consultation organized by the European Commission’ to ‘campaign for an ECI’.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 27–39 27
been declared to be foundational in article 10 of the
Treaty of the European Union. In addition, in article 11
the principle of participatory democracy has been es-
tablished and is conceptualized as a complement to the
system of representative democracy.5 The participatory
mechanismsdescribed in article 11 aremeant to improve
the democratic legitimacy of the EU by stimulating direct
exchanges between citizens, organizations of the mem-
ber states, and the EU institutions. Firstly, a constitu-
tional foundation is given to the practice of involving soci-
etal groups in the development of EU policies. (Marxsen,
2015, p. 153). Such a practice has existed throughout the
process of European integration but has predominantly
taken place in the back rooms of Brussels. Only since the
late 1990s, has this practice, in addition, taken the form
of open consultations by the Commission. Secondly, the
article describes mechanisms meant to involve citizens
in transnational exchanges regarding the EU’s course, es-
pecially by stimulating horizontal exchange between cit-
izens and organizations; in other words the EU wants to
create a European public and political sphere.
However, increasing CSOs role in the EU policymak-
ing could increase citizens’ participation but it may not
necessarily help in making the participation of societal
groups in the EU more representative. Since the 1980s,
many scholars have criticized CSO representation at the
system level of the EU for being biased and skewed in
favor of economic producer interests.
The central question of this article is whether online
consultations and the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)
have been helpful in making CSO participation more bal-
anced and representative.6 In order to answer this ques-
tion, different concepts of representation and represen-
tativeness need to be explained. Firstly, this article is con-
cerned with representativeness of CSOs at the system
level which must be distinguished from organizational
representativeness of CSOs. Secondly, such representa-
tiveness of CSOs at the system level can be assessed by
looking at actor representativeness or discourse repre-
sentativeness. By elaborating on the latter concept, in-
troduced by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), this article will
explain how it differs from the more conventional cri-
terion of representativeness that focuses on actors; dis-
course representativeness better fits with citizens’ frag-
mented identities.
Section 2 will explain how both indicators of repre-
sentativeness are relevant for assessing the effects of on-
line consultations and the ECI on the representativeness
of CSOs at the system level. In addition, I will explainwhat
data and sources have been consulted and analyzed in or-
der to make such an assessment.
Section 3 will explain how CSOs have been assigned
a role in solving the EU’s democratic deficit. Section 4 ad-
dresses the claim that CSO representation at the system
level is biased in favor of economic producer interests.
In section 5 and 6, the effects of online consultations
and ECIs on representativeness of CSOs at the system
level are described. In the conclusion (section 7) the cen-
tral question of this article will be answered.
2. Central Concepts and Methods
What would democratic representation of CSO at the EU
level entail? Recent publications concerning this issue
make two conceptual distinctions that are relevant here,
firstly, between organizational representativeness and
representativeness of CSOs at the system level. Organiza-
tional representativeness refers to the question whether
‘the positions defended by individual organizations are
a fair reflection of their constituents’ views’ (Rodekamp,
2014, p. 41). Rodekamp (2014) and Kröger (2016) have
researched the extent to which CSOs meet such a cri-
terion of organizational representativeness. This article
will focus instead on the representativeness of CSOs at
the EU system level. Representativeness of CSOs at the
system level concerns the question of whether the vari-
ous interests existing in society are equally represented
at the level of government (or EU) relations with and con-
sultations of CSOs (Rodekamp, 2014, p. 41).
The second conceptual distinction relevant to this
research is between actor representativeness and dis-
course representativeness. Both concepts of represen-
tativeness assume that a certain kind and level of cor-
respondence between interests present in EU–CSO re-
lations and European society at large is required. With
‘actor representativeness’ the focus is on actors and the
question whether the actors involved at the EU system
level are in proportion to the number of such actors
in society. This option, in which actors are central, is
reminiscent of Hanna Pitkin’s definition in which rep-
resentation consists of ‘making present of that which
is absent’ by a representative who resembles the rep-
resented, either in the geographic or the demographic
sense (Kröger, 2016, p. 12; Pitkin, 1967; Stone, 2013,
p. 360).7 The explicit or implicit standard of this idea of
representation is that the diversity and number of rep-
resentatives, such as the number of women, minorities
or people coming from a specific sub-region, should be
proportional to the diversity and number of people liv-
ing in the areas that they represent. However, as will be
elaborated on below, this idea of resemblance between
represented and representatives has been declared out-
dated in political theory.
The concept of discourse representativeness is based
on the idea that all relevant discourses present in soci-
ety should also be present in the deliberations at the EU
5 According to the principle of representative democracy, citizens of the European Union shall be represented by the European Parliament as well as the
governments of their states.
6 Notwithstanding the possessive pronoun ‘citizens’ in the label, the ECI in practice is normally used by organizations and not by individual citizens.
7 According to Stone (2013, p. 360), geographic representation prioritizes the link between a representative and the geographical area he or she comes
from. Demographic or descriptive representation means that representatives should share important social and economic characteristics with their
constituents, such as social class, gender or ethnicity.
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system level.8 Discourse refers to a way to conceptual-
ize an issue and put it into the narrative framework of
a broader perspective, such as the neoliberal discourse
does by framing unemployment as an individual respon-
sibility. The idea of representation by discourses is de-
veloped by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) who, embracing
Harré and Gillett’s (1994) idea of the self, acknowledge
how current identities are complex andmultifaceted. Be-
cause people’s identities are complex, fragmented and
fluid, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), as well as other schol-
ars, have searched to develop amore dynamic concept of
representation. Kröger (2016), for example, with regard
to the (individual) organizational representativeness of
CSOs, has put forward the interactive representative re-
lationship between the represented and the representa-
tive.9 However, here in this article we engage with CSO
representativeness at the EU system level. Dryzek and
Niemeyer’s (2008) concept of discourse representative-
ness, in which all relevant discourses on an issue should
be represented in the deliberations of the EU policy pro-
cess concerning it, seems to fit best with the need to ac-
knowledge the complexity, multitude and variability of
identities at this system level.10 These authors claim that
people should be represented primarily by discourses,
and only secondarily by actors speaking on behalf of such
discourses. The authors provide three reasons for this.
Firstly, the representation of all relevant discourses of-
fers better guarantees of the rationality of policy. This
is because the focus is on whether all discourses are
present, and in turn whether all vantage points for crit-
icizing policy are represented, as opposed to having a fo-
cus on the proportion to which people subscribe to a par-
ticular discourse. Secondly, because we are ‘selves that
inhabit different discourses’, having actors proportion-
ally represented instead of all relevant discourses would
only do justice to some of each person’s interests, iden-
tities, values and would leave others unaddressed. In-
stead, all discourses have to be represented in order for
the individual to be represented in their entirety. A third
reason links with the idea that some groups’ discourses,
such as discourses formulated from women’s perspec-
tives, have been historically excluded from the political
agenda. Having such groups proportionally represented
would lead to unitary framing and the marginalization
of what could be relevant differences in interests, for in-
stance between black and white women. Having all rel-
evant discourses represented provides some room for
maneuver and makes fluid positions possible instead of
fixed roles.
This article will analyze Quittkat’s (2013) and
Marxsen’s (2015) research on the participation of CSOs
in online consultations by the EU. These scholars looked
at the geographical origin of the actors participating in
online consultations as well as the economic interests
they represented. Section 4 will demonstrate how they
apply the concept of actor representativeness in assess-
ing representativeness.
Concerning the participation in and subjects ad-
dressed by ECIs, this article presents primary data. With
regard to geographical origin, data have been gathered
on whether the initiators of ECIs are from old or new
member states of the EU. Here the concept of actor rep-
resentativeness has been applied. With regard to eco-
nomic interests, the concept of discourse representative-
ness has been applied. The subjects addressed, firstly,
have been categorized in terms of policy fields. The policy
fields; Consumers, Economy and Monetary Affairs, Em-
ployment and Social Affairs, Enterprise and SingleMarket
all belong to the economic sphere (see section 6, table 1,
indicated with ‘x’ in the last column). Secondly, by look-
ingmore closely at the nine ECIs belonging to this sphere,
the presence of producer interests has been traced.
3. The Role of CSOs with Regard to EU’s Democratic
Deficit
CSOs have been accorded a role with regard to solving
the EU’s democratic deficit as compensators for the in-
stitutional and social deficiencies of EU politicians and
political parties and the absence of an EU demos. The
deficiencies of EU politicians and political parties in this
respect have been highlighted in the view of the deficit
as an institutional deficit, in which the deficit is mainly
‘a mismatch between policies increasingly operating at
the EU level while politics still mainly operates at the na-
tional level’ (Kröger, 2016, p. 25). The mismatch is most
clearly demonstrated by the fact that the elections of the
European Parliament (EP) are second-order elections as
voters’ choices are predominantly determined by how
they feel about the political parties in their national gov-
ernments (Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). CSOs are thought to
make up for such weak relations between MEPs and the
represented, by not only contributing to effective and ef-
ficient problem solving, but also functioning as ‘transmis-
sion belts’ for bringing the values of citizens to the EU.
The view of the democratic deficit of the EU as social
deficit regards its social deficiencies, more precisely the
absence of a demos, as themain problem for EU’s democ-
racy. Demos refers to the people of a nation forming a
political unit including a sense of recognizing each other
as members of the same polity (Kröger, 2016, p. 175;
Weiler, 1991). The development of a demos-equivalent
8 Dryzek and Niemeyer understand a discourse as ‘a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispo-
sitions, and capabilities. It enables the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can be shared in intersubjectively meaningful
fashion’ (2008, p. 481).
9 The represented instead of putting his/her trust in resemblance with the representative, nowadays, conceives of the representative as different from
himself or herself with respect to political interests, beliefs and goals.
10 The issue of representativeness at the system level concerns the question whether the various interests existing in society are equally represented at
the level of government relations with and consultations of CSOs. For a clear explanation of the distinctionwith representativeness at the organisational
level, see Rodekamp (2014, p. 41).
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at the EU level, so being outside the framework of a na-
tion state, is difficult due to the diversity of languages
and identities. A pre-requisite for such a development
would be the creation of a public sphere for debate that
could function as an authoritative channel of representa-
tion of viewpoints. CSOs, in addition to political parties
and themedia could play a role in this and could become
a key player because they are expected to foster mutual
trust between citizens and to construct common Euro-
pean interests.
The proponents of the thesis that CSOs can solve
the EU’s democratic deficit by compensating the deficien-
cies diagnosed above find empirical support for their ex-
pectations in existing representative democracies in na-
tion states. Firstly, CSOs already act as alternative medi-
ators of social interests. In European nation states citi-
zens have disengaged from the standard model of repre-
sentation as demonstrated by statistics concerning elec-
toral turnout, political partymembership, etc. (Heywood,
2013, pp. 444–447). Secondly, non-electoral forms of
representation in policy making already exist alongside
the electoral forms in such democracies, for example in
the form of functional representation of organizations
of employers and employees. Thirdly, as Kröger (2016,
p. 11) contends, in addition to—and within the frame-
work set by—representative institutions, non-electoral
representation by CSO has unfolded in such national rep-
resentative democracies by means of fora and informal
political processes that are part and parcel of a function-
ing public sphere.
In short, CSOs are expected to compensate for the
deficiencies mentioned above by two means: Firstly, by
creating a public sphere in which CSOs together look for
European wide solutions to economic and societal prob-
lems, and where they are willing to bargain and make
deals resting on compromises for the sake of the public
good; secondly, by making EU institutions responsive to
the broad range of interests represented by these CSOs as
well as the proposed solutions that result from their col-
lective bargaining. However, acknowledging CSOs’ func-
tion in contributing to EUpolicy in thismannerwould also
require attention to the question of whether the totality
of CSOs involved in such processes would be representa-
tive of the interests that are present in society.
The next section will explain how positive expec-
tations with regard to CSOs role in democracies are
connected to pluralist’s assumptions concerning equal
chances of access for interest groups to policy making.
However, such assumptions have been criticized and
many scholars have pointed at the bias that exists in CSO
representation at the EU system level.
4. The Bias in CSO Representation at the EU System
Level
Robert Dahl (1961) and Lindblom (1977) have already de-
fended the positive role of groups in politics long ago. In
their view, pluralist democracy is a form of democracy
that operates through the capacity of organized groups
and interests to articulate popular demands and ensure
responsive governance (Heywood, 2013, p. 101). Plural-
ists, such as Dahl and Lindblom, believe democracy fares
best in political systems in which a wide variety of inter-
est groups exist.11 Much like the adherents of the institu-
tional deficit approach above, the pluralists do notwant to
have the input of interest groups to replace that of elected
representatives; instead the former would have to com-
plement the latter. Well-balanced political decision mak-
ing would be served by interest groups operating along-
side the standard model of democratic representation.12
The pluralists have formulated the following condi-
tions for a healthy pluralist democracy that would pro-
duce well balanced decision making: firstly, the political
power would have to be widely dispersed amongst the
competing groups; secondly, the group leaders would
have to expose a high degree of internal responsiveness
towards their members; and, thirdly, the governmental
machine would have to be neutral and sufficiently frag-
mented to offer these groups a number of points of ac-
cess (Heywood, 2013, p. 101). In the case of CSOs’ rela-
tion with the EU, the third condition seems to be more
or less fulfilled, as the EU offers many access points for
groups’ efforts to influence (Héritier, 2003). The second
condition refers to the organizational representativeness
and not the representativeness of CSOs at the system
level concerned in this article.
This article mainly engages with the first pluralist con-
dition, the dispersal or equal distribution of power over in-
terest groups or CSOs. The pluralists themselves believed
that such equality would be possible. In fact their positive
expectations regarding CSOs were based on a twofold as-
sumption. Firstly, that all societal interests have an equal
chance of being organized and, secondly, that interest
groups or CSOs compete on an equal footing for access to
policy makers. However with respect to the first assump-
tion, Olson (1965) concluded that the larger the group of
individuals that share an interest, the harder it is to mobi-
lize the individuals involved into collective action because
of the free-rider-principle.13 In addition, Olson claimed
that some interests will be forgotten and ‘suffer in silence’
because they would lack the resources to make them-
selves heard (Olson, 1965, pp. 165–167; Rodekamp, 2014,
pp. 41–42).14 Therefore, with regard to the second plu-
11 Pluralists consider group politics as ‘the very stuff of the democratic process’ (Heywood, 2013, p. 248).
12 Political resources should be more or less equally distributed over such groups. However, as Dahl acknowledged, political resources such as money,
time, knowledge and control over jobs, each on its own, are unequally distributed. In his empirical study of the distribution of power in New Haven he
concluded that the politically privileged and the economically powerful are more powerful than ordinary citizens but that there was no ruling elite, in
the sense of a group that was able to dominate overall and permanently (Dahl, 1961).
13 The individual will enjoy the benefit accruing from a collective effort without him or herself actually contributing to the effort.
14 Kröger points at the historical example of how women longtime have been marginalized and how this has curtailed their possibilities of politically
organizing themselves and formulating what would be in women’s interests and putting the issues concerned on the political agenda (2016, p. 20).
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ralist assumption, Olson predicted that the system which
represents groups’ interests, instead of being balanced,
will be skewed in favor of interest groups who are able to
mobilize easily and have a material advantage.
Olson’s theoretical prediction has been empirically
confirmed within the EU. Streeck and Schmitter (1991,
p. 137) demonstrated that associations of business inter-
ests registered in Brussels ‘vastly outnumber’ those of la-
bor and that individual firms and sectoral and sub sec-
toral trade associations at the EU level primarily defend
producer interest, such as ‘demanding protection and/or
(de)regulation of product markets’ rather than defend
their interests as employers (1991, p. 141). Rodekamp
concludes that ‘various interests are not equally repre-
sented’ and refers to Berkhout and Lowery (2010), Green-
wood (2007), Kohler-Koch (2010) all ‘citing a dominance
of business over general interest organisations in the EU’
(2014, pp. 4, pp. 70–74).
5. Online Consultations
Most of the online consultations are conducted by using
the online consultation platform ‘Your voice in Europe’.15
TheCommission announces the consultations on its’web
portal as well as on the home pages of the Directorates-
General (DG). Such posts convey information concern-
ing the issue addressed and allow participants to either
answer (semi) standardized questionnaires or to make
comments regarding draft documents by e-mail or online.
The Commission’s purpose in undertaking these consul-
tations is not only to make the EU more democratic by
making it more inclusive, but also to make better pol-
icy by mobilizing external knowledge. Individual citizens
do participate in the Commission’s consultations but the
greatest level of involvement comes from stakeholders,
which are private companies, business associations, pub-
lic authorities and NGOs.
Marxsen (2015) and Quittkat’s (2013) have ad-
dressed the question whether online consultations con-
tribute to systemic representativeness of CSO at the EU
level. Similar to the scholars above they regard the state
of CSO participation in the EU before the implementa-
tions of new tools, such as online consultations and the
ECI, as biased:multinationals and trade organizations are
the dominant actors in the semi-formal and informal pro-
cesses of decision making of the EU.16 In addition, Quit-
tkat (2013, p. 106) mentions that the interests of CSOs of
the core member states tend to be better served in the
EU than those of the new member states, located in the
periphery of the EU.
Taking into consideration this twofold bias, Kohler-
Koch and Quittkat (2013) and Kröger (2016) agree that
CSOparticipation can only be democratically legitimate if
a broader, more inclusive, representation of interests at
the EU level would evolve from new policy than currently
exists. A more inclusive and better balanced deliberation
at the input side of EU decision making, according to
these authors, is one of the goals to be attained with the
introduction of online consultations and the ECI.17
Therefore,Marxsen (2015) andQuittkat (2013) did re-
search into the pattern of participation in the online con-
sultations by looking at the actors that participated (actor
representativeness). Marxsen found that in more than
70% of all consultations in 2011, business formed the
largest group of participants (2015, p. 162).18 This author
contends that private companies and business interest
groups establish a continuous presence in online consul-
tations, that only a few trade unions and consumer pro-
tection organizations can match (Marxsen, 2015, p. 162).
According to Quittkat, in the policy fields of public
health and in social affairs, a quarter and one thirds,
respectively, of the participants are private companies,
lobbyists and business interest associations. However, in
the policy fields of consumers and foods half of the sub-
missions where made by companies and trade organiza-
tions (2013, pp. 103–104).
In addition, Quitkatt detected a territorial bias in the
online consultations: CSO and public organizations com-
ing from the economically strong northern and western
EU member states, such as Germany and Great Britain,
are overrepresented at the expense of the representa-
tion of those from the southern and eastern member
states (Marxsen, 2015; Quittkat, 2013, p. 106).19
The conclusion of Marxsen (2015) and Quittkat
(2013) concerning the pattern of participation in the on-
line consultations is, firstly, that the range of interests in-
volved has not reallywidened and that ‘the field of partic-
ipants is strongly biased’ in favor of economic producer
interests (Marxsen, 2015, p. 162; Quittkat, 2013, p. 85).20
Secondly, CSO and public organizations coming from the
old member states are ‘overrepresented’.
The application of actor representativeness makes
sense in the latter case of ‘overrepresentation’ of CSOs
coming from old member states, as here we can decide
whether their part is proportional to the part of oldmem-
ber states in the EU. However, this is less clear with re-
gard to producer interests that are claimed to be dom-
inant. What would a ‘normal’ representation be? What
extent of producer interests would be legitimate?Would
it be possible to formulate a norm in terms of an accept-
15 ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations
16 Also see Rodekamp (2014, p. 70) who bluntly states that the European Commission’s consultation relations with civil society groups is controlled by a
small number of key players and calls such consultations ‘an elite project’.
17 In addition, the authors point at the need for publicity of results and negotiations and accountability of the actors involved.
18 The main reason for this most probably lies with the economic resources (finances, man power, organisations) that are needed to establish a contin-
uous presence in consultations, social and cultural interests in contrast with economic producers lack such resources.
19 The geographical bias, according toMarxsen (2015, p. 162), is to blame on the underdeveloped system of civil society organisation in the newmember
states.
20 Quittkat’s research is based on a large-N quantitative analysis, for more detail concerning the method (Quittkat, 2013, p. 87).
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able proportion of economic producer organizations de-
fending such interests? Such a norm is not referred to by
the authors, neitherwould it be easy to formulate this, as
the question is how to relate such proportion to the com-
position of the population: economic producers are not
discernible from consumers; people are both producers
and consumers at the same time.
Quittkat’s and Marxsen’s analyses and conclusions
concerning the enduring dominance of economic pro-
ducer interests in online consultations are important.
The reason for their dominance is that they have the re-
sources needed, such as money and personnel, to estab-
lish a continuous presence.Marxsen explicitly states that
‘societal spheres’ that represent ‘social or cultural inter-
ests’ are lacking such resources and therefore will lag be-
hind (2015, p. 162). His concern here seems to be that
certain policy fields, notably non-economic perspectives
tend to become neglected or marginalized.
These authors applied the concept of actor repre-
sentativeness in their assessment of online consultations
whereas their criticism concerning the dominance of eco-
nomic producer interest rather seems to refer to the ab-
sence andmarginalization of discourses that are relevant
for the issue at stake.
6. The ECI
The ECI is the other participatory mechanism that has
been put into place to improve the democratic legitimacy
of the EU. With the ECI, citizens can call on the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) to propose legislation on matters
where the Commission has the competence to do so.21
The initiative is a considerably different instrument to on-
line consultations. The most relevant difference here is
that it is up to citizens themselves to propose an issue
instead of them having to react to a proposal of one of
the EC’s Directorates-General. With this instrument citi-
zens have been given the opportunity to put an issue on
the political agenda of the EU or at least bring different
discourses in the public sphere of the EU.22
In order to submit an ECI to the EC, the initiators first
have to register the proposed initiative.23 Subsequently,
within a year they have to collect one million eligible sig-
natories coming from at least seven Member States.24
Once submitted the ECI becomes a formal demand to the
Commission to propose legislation and the Commission
is obliged, within threemonths, to communicate its legal
and political conclusions.
The ECI has beenmuch criticized for not really offering
citizens a chance to put their issues of concern on the EU
agenda. As the Commission is obliged to react to a submit-
ted ECI but not to put it on the formal agenda, it has kept
its monopoly of legislative initiative. In addition, many for-
mal andpractical hurdles have to be takenby the initiators
even to gather enough signatures for an official submittal
(European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015).25
Only three of the initiatives registered byMarch 2015
(table 1) have gathered enough signatures to be offi-
cially submitted to the EC, Right 2 Water, One of Us and
Stop Vivisection.26 However, through the act of register-
ing an ECI regarding an issue and trying to gather suffi-
cient signatures to submit it to the EuropeanCommission
(EC), public attention is gained and public debate can be
aroused. The strongest aspect of this instrument to im-
prove the representativeness of CSO participation in the
EU might be the fact that it has a ‘bottom up’ charac-
ter: the issue and the angle from which it is addressed,
in other words discourse in which to frame it, is decided
by (groups of) citizens themselves.
Therefore in the following assessment of represen-
tativeness of the ECI, in addition to the concept of ac-
tor representativeness, the concept of discourse repre-
sentativeness has been applied; the former with regard
to the question whether the geographic bias observed
in the participation of CSO in online consultations also
exists with regard to the initiators of ECIs. The term ini-
tiators refers to the members of the citizens’ commit-
tee, a committee of seven EU citizens, each coming from
a different member state, which organizes the initiative
and manages the procedure through the whole process
from initiation to the receipt of a conclusion from the
European Commission.27 In the table below, the initia-
tors of each initiative are categorized as coming from
old or new member states, or a mix of both.28 From this
21 Article 1, Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. The Regulation, containing the rules and procedures governing the ECI, was adopted by the EP and the Council
of the EU on 16 February 2011.The Citizen’s Initiatives could be launched from 1 April 2012.
22 For the different steps of the ECI procedure see figure A1 in the appendix.
23 Art. 4(2) of Regulation 211/2011 sets out four conditions that must be satisfied before a campaign is officially registered and can be launched. Firstly, a
citizens’ committee must be in place; secondly, the proposed initiative should prove to not ‘manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s
powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purposes of implementing the Treaties’; thirdly, the proposed initiative must ‘not be
manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious’; and fourthly, the proposed initiative must ‘not be manifestly contrary to the values of the Union’, as set out
in Article. The second requirement, Article 4.2 (b), has proven to be a real hurdle for all the proposed initiatives (European Citizen Action Service, 2014).
24 In addition a minimum number of signatures has to come from each member state which equals the member states number of MEP’s multiplied by
750.
25 This report of the EPRS is essentially based on the findings and recommendations of five former reports on the implementation and functioning of
the ECI: In addition to European Citizen Action Service (2014), these are Policy Department C of the European Parliament (2014). European Citizens’
Initiative—First Lessons of Implementation; The European Ombudsman’s own-initiative enquiry (OI/9/2013/TN) into the functioning of the European
Citizens’ Initiative (December 2013–November 2014), Organ’s (2014), and Berg and Thomson (2014).
26 For the list of initiatives that have been registered since the introduction of this instrument in April 2012 until March 2015, the subjects addressed,
dates of registration and initiators, see table A1 in the appendix.
27 These must be EU citizens who have a right to vote and who each live in a different country. The members of such committee must be natural persons
Article 2(3) of the Regulation (EU) No 211/201.
28 The entrance year 2004 has been set as boundary between old and new in this respect.
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categorization it can be concluded that actors from new
member states do participate in initiating ECIs (five out
of twenty-seven initiatives), mostly in collaboration with
actors from old member states. However, their participa-
tion is not proportional (yet) to the part of new member
states in the total number of the EU member states (thir-
teen out of twenty eight states).
The concept of discourse representativeness is ap-
plied by looking at the list of the registered initiatives and
by categorizing the subject of each of these initiatives in
terms of the policy fields of the EU in the table below.29
To what extent have the issues addressed in ECIs
been presented in discourses that are alternative to
those focused on economic producer interests? Nine
29 Based on the list of topics addressed and elaborated on at the official EU website http://europa.eu
Table 1. Registered ECIs chronologically ordered (date of first registration).
European Citizens’ Initiatives Initiating actors come from: Field of policy: Economy
1. Fraternité 2020 Old MS Education, Training and Youth
2. Dairy Cow Welfare Old MS Agriculture (Animal Welfare)
3. Right 2 Water Old MS Human Rights
4. Single Communication Tariff Act Old MS Consumers/Single Market x
5. One of Us Old MS Human Rights
6. Let me Vote Old MS EU Citizenship
7. Stop vivisection Old MS Research and Innovation
8. High Quality European Education for all Old MS Education, Training and Youth
9. Responsible waste incineration Old MS Environment
10. Suspension 2009 EU Climate and Poland and Czech Climate action/ Economic and x
Energy Package Republic (+ Old MS) Monetary Affair
11. Central Online Collection Platform Old MS Justice and Home Affairs
for ECI
12. End Ecocide Old MS (cross border Environment
movers) + Estland
13. European Initiative for Media Pluralism Old MS Audiovisual and Media
14. 30 km/h-making the streets loveable Old MS Environment
15. End EU–Switzerland Agreement on Old MS Single Market x
Free Movement of People
16. Unconditional Basic Income Old MS Employment and Social Affairs x
17. ACT 4 Growth Balkans ( + Old MS) Enterprise x
18. Teach for Youth- Upgrade Erasmus 2.0 Old MS Education, Training and Youth
19. Do not count education spending Greece, Bulgaria Education, Training and Youth
as part of the deficit + Old MS
20. Weed Like to Talk Old MS Health/ Justice and Home Affairs
21. European Free Vaping initiative Old MS +USA Enterprise x
22. Turn me off! Old MS Environment
23. New Deal 4 Europe Czech Republic + Old MS Enterprise/Environment x
24. MOVEUROPE Old MS Culture
25. An end to front companies Old MS Economic and Monetary Affairs* x
26. For a socially fair Europe! Old MS Employment and Social Affairs x
27. On the Wire Old MS Justice and Home Affairs
* This initiative believes front companies to lead to criminal money laundering and threatening the stability of the financial system and
the internal market.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 27–39 33
ECIs out of the twenty-seven in the table have been cat-
egorized as a policy field that concerns the economic
sphere (numbers 4, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, and 26).
The other eighteen initiatives concern Human Rights, in-
cluding political rights and rights of defendants, Animal
welfare, Education, Environment and Culture. Of the nine
ECIs concerning economic issues, only in one case, num-
ber 21 which proposed to take e-cigarettes out of reg-
ulation by de-classifying them as tobacco or medicines.
(Tobacco Products Directive), the discourse was clearly
based on producers’ interests.30 In addition, a closer look
has been given to the Suspension of the 2009 EU Climate
and Energy Package (number 10) initiative. By suspend-
ing the Climate and Energy Package the initiators wanted
to prevent member states spending their money for ac-
tion on these subjects and instead to make fuel and en-
ergy cheaper. Because of the latter, one could say pro-
ducer interests are involved. However, taking into regard
the motive expressed by the committee itself the na-
tional states’ economics and finances seem to be the pri-
mary interests involved.
Six of the remaining seven ECIs concerning economic
issues, are focused on consumer interests (The Single
Communication Tariff Act), the prevention of instability
on the financial and internal market by preventing crimi-
nal money from entering the formal financial system (An
end to front companies) or the restructuring of the econ-
omy from a social justice and/or environmental point of
view:Unconditional Basis Incomewants to strengthen so-
cial security arrangements,Act for Growth asks for public
support for female entrepreneurship, the New Deal for
Europe asks for investments in the production and financ-
ing of European public goods that are sustainable and
protective for the environment and cultural heritage, For
a socially fair Europe! wants to fight social exclusion and
poverty in the EU.31 The seventh, End EU–Switzerland
Agreement on Free Movement of People, is a rather pe-
culiar initiative that mainly aims to punish Switzerland, a
non EU country, for breaching the agreement concerning
Free Movement of People with the EU.
Notably, none of the initiatives that concern the eco-
nomic sphere was successful enough to be submitted
to the Commission. In other words the successful initia-
tives; Right to Water, One of Us, and Stop Vivisection are
noneconomic initiatives.
7. Conclusion
The answer to the questionwhether online consultations
and the ECI have improved the representativeness of
CSOs at the system level of the EU depends on whether
the concept of actor representativeness or discourse rep-
resentativeness is applied. With regard to online con-
sultations, the former concept has been applied in re-
search concluding the continued existence of a twofold
bias, favoring CSOs coming from old member states and
defending economic production interests, respectively.
However, regarding the latter, the concept of actor rep-
resentativeness does not really fit, as to claim an over-
representation of economic producers cannot be consis-
tent without stating what presence of economic produc-
ers would be proportional and legitimate.
Therefore, in tracing the effects of the ECI on repre-
sentativeness of CSOs at the system level, in addition to
actor representativeness, discourse representativeness
has been applied. The former has been applied by look-
ing at what member states (old or new) the actors initiat-
ing ECIs came from, concluding that those coming from
old member states are overrepresented, although actors
fromnewmember states are present. Applying discourse
representativeness to the ECI leads to a positive con-
clusion about this tool’s effect on representativeness of
CSOs at the system level. This is, firstly, because many
issues falling outside the economic sphere have been ad-
dressed and, secondly, of those falling within this sphere
only one out of twenty-seven (e-cigarettes) was concep-
tualized in a discourse thatmade people look at the issue
from the perspective of economic producer interests.
The ECI would need revision, because as it is, (poten-
tial) initiators are confronted with too many obstacles to
make registering initiatives a popular option. However,
with respect to discourse representativeness and a lively
European public debate, the first three years have shown
this instrument to be promising.
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Figure A1. The different steps of the ECI procedure. Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2015, p. 7).
Table A1. Subjects addressed and registration date per registered ECI until March 2015.
European Citizens’ Initiatives Subject Registration Date* Initiating Committee
1. Fraternité 2020
Expand exchange programmes










2. Dairy Cow Welfare
A EU Directive that guarantees







Leopoldine DE BROSSES (NEE
CHARBONNEAUX)


















5. One of Us
Seeking an end to EU funding
of activities involving








6. Let me Vote
Extend voting rights of EU
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Table A1. Subjects addressed and registration date per registered ECI until March 2015 [cont.].
European Citizens’ Initiatives Subject Registration Date* Initiating Committee
7. Stop vivisection
Proposal to end animal
experimentation and instead
make compulsory the use—in
biomedical and toxicological
research—of data directly




Daniel FLIES, Claude REISS,
Nuria QUEROL VIÑAS, Robert
MOLENAAR
8. High Quality European
Education for all
Establish a stakeholder
platform to formulate a










Pointing at the environmental
impact of waste incineration. 16 July 2012




10. Suspension 2009 EU
Climate and Energy Package
Change existing policy in the
Climate and Energy area, make
fuel and energy cheaper and
allow member states to use
their own natural energy
resources in order.
8 August 2012






11. Central Online Collection
Platform for ECI
Improving ICT infrastructure
support for ECIs 27 August 2012
Joerg MITZLAFF, Marcin





Adopt legislation to prohibit,
prevent and pre-empt Ecocide,
the extensive damage,





Prisca MERZ, Viktoria HELLER,
Thomas EITZENBERGER,
Valerie CABANES, Tania Lúcia
ROQUE, Kadri KALLE, Ramón
MARTINEZ




of national rules on media
ownership and transparency,







DE ZULUETA, Ioana Adriana
AVADANI, Granville WILLIAMS,
Esther DURIN,
Peter MOLNAR, Asen Petrov
VELICHKOV
14. 30 km/h–making the
streets liveable
Setting a default speed limit for











Call to terminate the
Agreement on freedom of
movement (21 June 1999)
between the Swiss
Confederation, on the one
hand, and the European
Community and its Member
States.
19 November 2012
Michael WANG, Boris STEFFEN,
Sandra SEIDL, Andersson
MARIA, Leevi VIRTANEN, Adam
NOVAK, Martin JANSEN
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Table A1. Subjects addressed and registration date per registered ECI until March 2015 [cont.].
European Citizens’ Initiatives Subject Registration Date* Initiating Committee
16. Unconditional Basic
Income
Encourage EU member states






RAPTIS, Anne MILLER, Stanislas
JOURDAN, Branko GERLIC
17. ACT 4 Growth
Four concrete proposals for
policy intervention to develop
female entrepreneurship as a
strategy for sustainable
economic growth in Europe.
10 June 2013







18. Teach for Youth–
Upgrade Erasmus 2.0
Eliminating educational
inequity within the EU by
enrolling highly motivated and
high-achieving recent EU
college graduates and
postgraduates to teach for one







TARDELL, Claartje VAN DAM,
Delia TOJA DE LA MUELA
19. Do not count education
spending as part of the
deficit.
Exclude from the calculation of
each country’s public spending
deficit, that part of
Government spending for
education that is lower than










20. Weed Like to Talk
Legalizing cannabis, making the
EU adopt a common policy on
the control and regulation of




FESEFELDT, Delia TOJA DE LA
MUELA, Pieter David VERDAM,
Gaelle VAN BERWAER, Miriam
TARDELL, Marta LORIMER
21. European Free Vaping
initiative
Classification of electronic
cigarettes and related products
through legislation as general
purpose recreational products,
and not as medicinal, tobacco









22. Turn me off!
Prohibit empty offices and
shops from leaving their lights
switched on
3 February 2014





23. New Deal 4 Europe
A public investment plan to
help Europe get out of the
crisis through the development
of knowledge society and the
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Table A1. Subjects addressed and registration date per registered ECI until March 2015 [cont.].
European Citizens’ Initiatives Subject Registration Date* Initiating Committee
24. MOVEUROPE
Creation of MOVEUROPE CARD.
A card reducing transport and
accommodation costs on the
weekend of May 9th in order to
celebrate the European Union
in a European city (on an
annual rotating basis).
24 March 2014
Niccolo Ruben PAGANI, Camille
ANDRIEU, Louise ANDRIEU,
Giselle ANDRIEU, Timea SUTO,
Leyre Luisa AZCONA SANZ DE
GALEANO, Katalin JAKUCS,
Florian Alexander SPATZ, Ana
DASKALOVA BOYKOVA
25. An end to front companies
Introduction of a legal
instrument in the company law
area, of measures to ensure the
transparency of legal persons
and legal arrangements.
1 October 2014







26. For a socially fair Europe!
Encouraging a stronger
cooperation between EU









27. On the Wire
Strengthening communication
privacy between private
individuals by law and namely
wiretapping of lawyer-client
communications. A





RUSCA, Hugh MERCER, Yves
OSCHINSKY, Stefan VON
RAUMER, François MOYSE
* In the first two years of the ECI’s existence campaigners experienced many logistics problems caused by unforeseen delays concerning
certification of the online collection system and finding appropriate and affordable host servers (European Commission, 2015, p. 9).
Four of the ECIs registered in 2012, the first year, have chosen to withdraw and re-register their initiative in order to win back time, the
re-registration date is indicated between brackets in this column of the table.
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